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Constitutional
Technicalities
in Criminal
Tax Cases
by Randy Bruce Blaustein

Because taxation is a division of accounting, it might seem at the outset,
that the most basic of defenses available
in a criminal tax case is to dispute the
government's contention that the debits
and credits were not reported correctly.
As important as that defense might be,
there are numerous cases in which, instead, constitutional defenses are heavily relied upon. This article focuses on a
series of tax cases decided on constitutional issues.
The violation of a citizen's prescribed
constitutional rights make invalid the introduction of specific evidence in court.
Administration of tax law is no exception; it is not uncommon to find that violations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, among others, occur during the
investigation of criminal tax matters. It is,
of course, unrealistic to believe that consideration of these issues will at all times
be found valid. However, if successful,
these violations may decide the case.
One of the most basic of all tax questions is the fundamental legality of the
tax system. In the case of W. C. [bug las,
his objections to payment of income tax
were two-fold: while contending that
payment of tax may be used to antiAmerican advantages, his major objection was the unconstitutionality of income tax. This alleged unconstitutionality was his sole justification for failure to
file a tax retum.
In a 1973 decision by the 5th Circuit
Court of Appeals. U.S. v. W. C. Douglas,
476 F.2nd 260, the court held that the
fact that the taxpayer willfully failed to
file a return as a means of political protest
was not a defense. The appellant, a medical doctor, was a self-styled "super"
patriot. Dr. Douglas's philosophy was
that the federal government, because of

the influence of certain communists or
communist sympathizers, had given
monetary and other forms of aid to
enemies of the United States. He felt that
to contribute to this aid by paying taxes
would be treason. The taxpayer advocated the repeal of the Sixteenth
Amendment because the income tax itself is unconstitutional. He, also, thought
the tax to be illegally administered because it is not levied equally on all citizens.
For the years 1966 and 1967 Dr.
Douglas filed a form 1040 with only his
name, address, signature and the words
"UNDER PROTEST" written across the
face of the return. Section 7203 of the
Internal Revenue Code, which makes it
a misdemeanor to willfully fail to file a tax
return, supply information or pay tax,
was found to be violated.
Double jeopardy provides that no
person shall be subject to prosecution for
the same offense more than once. This
defense was used by Joseph Page in his
federal tax case. Prior to a federal indictment being issued for tax evasion,
Page entered a plea of guilty to New
Yo~k State charges for making false and
fraudulent tax returns. The same income
tax data was used in the preparation of
both returns. The taxpayer argued that
the use of the same income tax data in
the two sets of returns (federal and state)
constituted a single offense.
The District Court, 65-2 USTC 9582,
made the analogy that the offenses were
as distinct as two hold-ups with the same
pistol. The defendant was not placed in
double jeopardy. He was indicted both
by the State of New York and the federal
government for tax evasion for the same
years, having committed two distinct
crimes. The crimes had nothing in common, except the use of the same income
tax data.
The Sixth Amendent states in part that
"[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense."
The 4th Circuit found in U.S. v. Hefner,
420 F.2nd 809 (1970), thatthe appellant
was deprived of such constitutional
guarantee. Hefner had furnished false
and fraudulent statements of federal income tax withholding to his employer.
When this situation was brought to the

attention of the Internal Revenue Service, special agents of the Intelligence
DiviSion made a preliminary investigation and subsequently arranged for an
interview with Hefner on two occasions.
At the first interview he was advised by
the agents that he was not required to
furnish any information which might
tend to incriminate him, and that anything he said could be used against hirn.
However, Hefner was not advised at
either interview that he could retain
counsel to assist him.
The court's attention was focused on
a narrower issue than the violation of a
constitutional right; that issue being the
failure of a government agency to
scrupulously observe rules or procedures which it has established. The procedure in question is contained in I.R.S.
News Release #897, which stated in
part that "[ilf the potential criminal aspects of the matter are not resolved by
preliminary inquiries and further investigation becomes necessary, the special
agent is required to advise the taxpayer
of his Constitutional rights to remain silent and to retain counsel."
The court concluded that the admission of a special agent's testimony concerning incriminating statements made
by a defendant at an interview without '
the agent having complied with prescribed procedures was not permissible.
The fact that the procedures established
by the I.R.S. for protecting Constitutional
rights of persons suspected of tax fraud
during investigations were more generous than the Constitution required, and
that the instructions were not promulagted in a formally labeled regulation,
was of no significance.
In a similar case, a woman who was
engaged to the appellee informed the Intelligence Division that her fiancee might
be guilty of income tax evasion. She
then proceeded to detail certain information about business transactions, bank
accounts, etc. As the information received was vague the case was referred
to the Audit Division to determine the
existence of any additional tax liability.
The revenue agent concluded that over
$100,000 in income was not reported
and that there were indications of fraud.
The case was then routinely referred to
the Intelligence Division which con-
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ducted a criminal investigation.
The Court found, in U.S. v. Robson,
477 F.2d 13 (1973), that where a revenue agent made the same type of civil
audit that he conducted in all cases, regardless of initial impetus from the Intelligence Division, and that he had no
interim conferences with Intelligence
representatives, and was under no obligation to report to them unless his audit
uncovered an indication of fraud, no
Miranda-type warnings were required.
The fact that an informant's tip led to the
audit originally and came from the Intelligence Division did not mean that the
revenue agent was an agent of the Intelligence Division. Therefore, there was
no violation of due process in the agent's
failure to give warnings required to special agents of the Intelligence Division.
The lack of confidentiality between an
accountant and his client was the issue in
the case of Lillian Couch, since it eventually led to self-incrimination. In a recent Supreme Court case, Couch v.

U.S., No. 71-889, (Jan. 9, 1973), the
petitioner claimed that her privilege
against self-incrimination would be violated if an lR.S. summons requiring certain of her books and records in the possession of her accountant was enforced.
The court held that the summons should
be enforced. The privilege against selfincrimination did not apply to a taxpayer's records that were in the possession of her accountant even though she
retained ownership. The privilege is personal and protects possession rather
than ownership. Personal complusion
against the taxpayer was lacking since
the records were in the accountant's
possession. In a related issue the court
ruled that the taxpayer's claim that the
confidential nature of the accountantclient relationship gave rise to an expectation of privacy, thus preventing production of the records under the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments, was not recognized. No confidential accountant-client
privilege exists under federal law.

Because there is no confidential
accountant-client relationship, any attorney who retains an accountant during
a fraud case should issue a formal retainer letter. Other factors to protect the
client would be for the accountant to be
paid directly by the attorney and for an
agreement to be written which states that
the accountant's workpapers were the
property of the attorney. The accountant
would then be protected from compulsory disclosure of subsequent worksheets, communications and taxpayer's
records.
The examples cited above are only an
indication of the realm from which defenses may be drawn. Constitutional defenses are basic even to tax cases and
obviously should not be overlooked.
Unfortunately, many of the decisions
rendered in the U.S. Court of Appeals
are not consistent among circuits; therefore, what might be considered unconstitutional in one circuit may be acceptable in another.
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